PESTEL ANALYSIS For Teuer Furniture
Please provide PESTEL ANALYSIS for the following case:
In 2012, Teuer Furniture—a privately owned, moderately sized chain of upscale home furnishing showrooms in the United States—had survived the economic recession and was growing. As the firm was now on secure financial ground, a number of long-term investors, including several of Teuer’s original non-management investors, asked to sell their shares. Up until this point, Teuer had distributed its excess cash flow in the form of dividends and had avoided repurchasing stock from its investors because of the difficulty of valuing a private firm. The firm had never repurchased shares from its investors. Teuer’s decision of whether to finance the investor buyout from cash generated by the business or to seek new equity investors was postponed until a valuation of the business could be obtained. To begin the valuation process, Teuer’s chief financial officer, Jennifer Jerabek, and her finance team were asked to assemble a set of forecasts upon which the valuation and stock price would be based.
Teuer Furniture was launched in 2003 to serve the demand for high-quality designer furniture sold in a high-touch environment outside of the major metropolitan areas. The firm opened its first showroom at the end of 2003 in Kansas City, Missouri, and had since grown to twenty-nine showrooms (see Exhibit 1). Teuer had concentrated on second-tier cities in terms of size in the Midwest and now had showrooms in Des Moines (Iowa), Columbia (Missouri), Kansas City (Missouri and Kansas), Lawrence (Kansas), and the outlying suburbs of St. Louis (Missouri). The current plan was to open an additional six showrooms over the next three years. As these showrooms would be in the same cities in which Teuer currently had showrooms, they would all be supplied from Teuer’s centrally located distribution center.
Teuer Furniture’s Market Niche
Teuer’s furniture lines ranged from French Country to Queen Anne. The firm sold furniture for all rooms in the home, from the bedroom to the dining room. Its seating offerings ranged from sofas and chairs appropriate for formal living areas to more casual furniture for family gathering spaces. Teuer’s target market was upper-income individuals who valued high-quality furnishings. The furniture was well-designed and well-made but not inexpensive. The firm’s target customers appreciated quality and were willing to pay for it with money but not time. Thus, providing a convenient and attentive shopping experience was essential to its strategy.
Teuer did not manufacture any of the furniture it sold. It had a network of domestic producers, mainly in the Southeast, who designed and manufactured furniture that was then sold under the Teuer brand name. Teuer offered fewer lines of furniture than some of its competitors, as it targeted only the upper-end market. Its customers, however, expected a wide variety of styles, sizes, and patterns. Thus, having a large selection of inventory in its showrooms or the distribution center (which was less than one day’s drive from any of the twenty-nine showrooms) was a significant selling point for its customers.
In addition to a large selection, Teuer placed great value on its sales associates. It had a rigorous selection process for hiring and ongoing training programs to provide its sales associates with the skills they needed to succeed. Teuer recruitment focused on finding outgoing individuals that enjoyed “helping a friend furnish their home”—the firm’s philosophy. Customers were encouraged not to buy until they were ready. “Please don’t feel any pressure to make a decision today. We trust you will be back when you are ready.” was the associates’ message to uncertain customers. As a result, a large fraction of sales after the first year were repeat customers or friends of past customers. Staff turnover was low, and compensation was appropriately generous. A well-paid and well- trained sales associate provided the low-key, high-personal-touch customer experience that Teuer aimed for.
A Limited Capital Investment Strategy
Teuer Furniture began as an experiment by Kim Smithson and Scott Casper. Both had been in the retail sector for a number of years, albeit in different roles. Casper worked as a consultant after business school. Since then he had moved between industry and consulting, but always with a focus on retail logistics. He spent a number of years at Heilig-Meyers, one of the largest furniture retailers in the United States in the mid-1990s.1 Through his work for Heilig-Meyers and other retail clients, he had come to appreciate the importance of understanding the supplier’s operational and financial constraints. Smithson started with Jennifer Convertibles after business school and worked in a number of management roles, becoming familiar with all aspects of the firm’s retail operations.
The two were looking for a new challenge and felt there was an opportunity to pool their respective areas of knowledge and create a new firm. Smithson felt there was an opportunity to create a shopping experience that would generate long-term customer loyalty, and this vision drove the firm’s strategy. Casper’s contacts in the industry allowed the firm to rapidly secure a set of suppliers who could help design and then manufacture the high-quality furniture Teuer needed in a timely manner.
The challenge they faced was limited capital, and this also drove their strategy. Because Smithson and Casper expected to spend heavily on hiring, training, and inventory, they looked for other methods of conserving capital. Their original showrooms were leased, which saved Teuer from having to raise capital to purchase the land and build the showrooms that it needed. Some of the early showrooms were modifications of existing retail space. After the first few years, Smithson and Casper had a better understanding of what kind of space fit with the firm’s philosophy. At this point, they arranged with their landlords to build showrooms to their specifications. The arrangement had been successful, and Teuer continued to lease all twenty-nine of its locations. This strategy not only freed up capital for other uses but also let the firm concentrate on its product selection and employee development. Because it was located in few geographic areas, potential landlords would approach Teuer with locations. Eliminating the need to scout for new locations saved time for senior management, especially during Teuer’s high growth period.2 Management only needed to evaluate the appropriateness of locations that were brought to them.
Although Teuer did not spend money on land and buildings, it did build out the interiors. The optimal layout of the showrooms was critical to producing high sales in each location. Figuring out the correct design took a few tries, and thus the design evolved through Teuer’s first few showrooms. The challenge was to create easy flow through the sizeable showrooms without making the customer feel like he or she was visiting a warehouse.3 The showroom inventory had to be sizable but not overwhelming. The other challenge was to help customers envision what the furniture would look like in their homes. Thus, the showrooms were designed as a set of “rooms” that had multiple entries and exits so a customer could wander from a bedroom to a family room to a dining room. Design kiosks, available in several places in the showrooms, allowed sales associates to pull up 3D pictures of a requested sofa, for example, in a different size or fabric pattern. Combining the ability to visualize the pattern or style that the customer was interested in with the ability to try out a version of the sofa in the showroom proved to be an effective method for producing a sale.
Although customers might take a long time to decide on a purchase, once a decision was made, they wanted to have the furniture in their homes quickly. As part of the high-touch customer service, delivery and setup were included in the purchase price of any items customers did not take with them. Having a central distribution center made rapid delivery possible in most cases, but it also meant that Teuer had to have an extensive inventory in its showrooms and the distribution center. At the end of 2012, Teuer’s inventory was about $33 million, which was approximately 48 percent of the next year’s estimated cost of goods sold (CGS) (see Exhibit 3 (income statement) and Exhibit 4 (balance sheet)). This meant that Teuer maintained inventory equal to about six months of its anticipated sales for the next year. This investment was costly in terms of the amount of capital it tied up ($33 million), but it was worth the investment because of the greater quantity of sales as well as the gross margins Teuer was able to generate as a result (58 percent in 2012).
Teuer was initially tempted to ask its suppliers to help finance its inventory by requiring them to provide very long payment terms. However, many of Teuer’s suppliers were reluctant, unable, or unwilling to provide longer terms. In addition, Teuer wanted to maintain goodwill with its suppliers for those cases in which Teuer ran unexpectedly low on a specific item. Suppliers could be in a position to decide whether to quickly ship an item or not. Thus, Teuer consistently paid its suppliers on the specified due date.4 This process was automated and thus required little additional attention by the office staff.
2 Teuer’s early years were also a period of rapid growth in the industry. The growth of aggregate furniture sales peaked in 2004 at an annual growth rate of 7.3 percent
3 The showrooms ranged from 12,800 to 23,300 square feet, with an average of about 18,000 square feet. The basic footprint of the showrooms was similar (after the first few showrooms), but due to variation in the plots of land and expected volume, there was some variation in size across locations. Originally, Teuer management thought the similar layouts would be valuable to customers, as the familiar surroundings would make them feel comfortable when they visited different Teuer showrooms. Later research found that customers usually shopped only at the showroom closest to their homes, so this proved to be only a minor advantage.
4 Suppliers billed Teuer after delivery, which took one to three weeks, depending on the supplier. Almost all of the suppliers expected payment sixty days after delivery. Teuer has approximately $11 million in accounts payable at the end of 2012, which is equal to 16 percent of the next year’s (2013’s) forecasted cost of goods sold. Although Teuer did not technically borrow from its employees or the TV, radio stations, or newspapers in which it advertised, neither did it pay these individuals and firms immediately. These bills were paid after two to three weeks, on average. Thus, Teuer forecasted its accrued expenses (such as wages, benefits, and advertising) as a percentage of expected selling, general, and administrative expense (SGA) and advertising expense.
Teuer’s Financial Performance
Early Expansion Years
The timing of Teuer’s launch was fortuitous. The economy had come out of a recession several years earlier and was growing nicely. Total sales in the furniture industry grew 5 percent per year from 2003 to 2006 (see Exhibit 2). As a newcomer to the market, Teuer’s sales grew much faster. Sales were always low on a square footage basis in the first year of a showroom location. It took time for customers to become aware of a new location and initially for Teuer to build its brand. Teuer’s low-pressure approach to selling also contributed to low sales initially. Management’s intuition proved correct, however, as sales grew rapidly once the showrooms were established. The sales of Teuer’s first showroom, which opened in 2003 in Kansas City, Missouri, grew 82 percent in 2005 and 39 percent in 2006. Through a combination of rapid organic growth and the opening of new showrooms, total firm sales grew from a little over $2 million in 2004 to $51.5 million by 2007.
Financial Crisis and Non-Durable Consumption
The past several years had not been good to the home furnishing industry. The recession of 2008 was the worst the United States had seen in more than two decades, and it hit consumer durables particularly hard. Although GDP fell only 2.2 percent in 2009, furniture sales fell more dramatically (see Exhibit 2). The growth rate of aggregate sales began falling in 2005, and growth turned negative in 2007 as the housing market peaked. Total furniture sales fell 13.4 percent in 2009, which brought total sales to $86.3 billion, or 24 percent below the 2006 peak of $113 billion (see Exhibit 2). Large home furnishings, like the purchase of homes and automobiles, were big- ticket purchases, were sometimes financed, and were purchases that consumers felt could be deferred. Thus, when economic times were tough—or worse, uncertain—customers postponed large furniture purchases.
The length of the recession and the anemic recovery from it had created enormous disruption in the industry. Since 2006, no fewer than six large home furnishing or appliance retailers had filed for bankruptcy or liquidated.5 Given the industry’s performance, Teuer did surprisingly well during the recession. Its sales never declined, although the growth rate of sales dropped dramatically from 93 percent in 2007 to 15 percent in 2009. Teuer’s ability to avoid a decline in sales was not because its showrooms and customers were unaffected by the recession—they were affected. Teuer’s sales continued to grow only because of the rapid rate at which it opened showrooms as the country went into the recession. Looking at showroom-level growth (sales growth for showrooms open at least a year), the drop in sales is apparent. (Showroom-level income statements are contained in Exhibit 5 and showroom-level balance sheets are contained in Exhibit 6.) For example, sales at Teuer’s original showroom in Kansas City peaked at $6.3 million in 2008 and then fell 13.2 percent
5 Some of the firms that had filed for bankruptcy and/or liquidated were: Venture Stores, Inc. (March 2007), Rowe Companies (October 2007), Jennifer Convertibles (July 2010), Gottschalks, Inc. (February 2011), RoomStore, Inc. (December 2011), and GuildMaster, Inc. (December 2012). Other firms were at risk. One analyst report noted that Furniture Brands International “could face the risk of bankruptcy or potential financial restructuring.” Bradley Thomas, Jason Campbell, and Bonanza Chalaban, “Furniture Brands International: Challenges Remain But Leading Indicators Improve,” KeyBanc Capital Markets, November 1, 2012. Furniture Brand International’s sales had continued to shrink, the firm had lost money for each of the last four years, and it had consumed more cash than expected in the third quarter of 2012.
to $5.5 million in 2009 before recovering slowly. Sales for this first showroom had not yet regained their 2008 level, but were expected to by 2014 (see Exhibit 5).
Like many in the consumer durables industry, Teuer did not see the recession coming. Because its business model had proven to be successful, Teuer took advantage of expansion opportunities and the unused capacity in its distribution center. It opened six showrooms in 2007, its highest number, just as the furniture market started to falter. It was planning on opening eight, but contract negotiations (fortunately) delayed two locations. An equal number of showrooms were planned for 2008, but most of those were shelved as it became apparent that further expansion was not wise in the economic climate at the time. Teuer only opened two showrooms in 2008 and just one in 2009. This was more than the firm would have preferred, but it was already committed in one case and wanted to secure prime locations in the other two. The rate of showroom expansions had dropped significantly. Teuer’s current plan is to open only six more showrooms over the next three years (see Exhibit 1).
Unlike other home furnishing retailers, Teuer’s profits did not drop in the recession. Teuer did not generate a profit until 2008 (at which point Teuer had twenty-one showrooms open).6 Because of the high start-up costs, the time it took for customers to become aware of the showrooms, and the fact that much of the firm’s investment was expensed, new showrooms were not immediately profitable.7 Because Teuer was rapidly opening showrooms in its early years, the losses from the larger number of new showrooms initially swamped the profits from the smaller number of more established locations. As with sales, the profitability of some showrooms dipped in the recession (see Exhibit 5), but total profits did not (see Exhibit 3).8 The positive profitability helped Teuer finance its continued expansion through the recession. Unlike many of its competitors, it was not beholden to the financial markets.
Recent Financial Performance
Despite the recent economic disruption of its industry, Teuer’s financial performance had been quite sound. Sales grew a healthy 11 percent in 2012 and were expected to continue growing, albeit at a declining rate as the showrooms matured and fewer new showrooms were opened. The firm’s gross profit margin had risen to 58 percent and its net profit margin had risen to 15 percent.9 The firm expected to finance its remaining six showrooms with funds generated from operations. It did not anticipate a need for external financing to finance its growth.
6 Due to prior years’ losses, Teuer did not start paying taxes until 2009 (see Exhibit 3).
7 As discussed above, Teuer did not invest large sums in land and buildings; it leased them. Its investment was in working capital, advertising, and employee training. Although the value of the advertising, employee training, and resulting consumer loyalty was captured over a number of years, these expenses were completely charged against earnings in the year in which they were spent. Firms that must expense their investment thus look less profitable in the early years.
8 The profits of the 2003 store dropped from $2,143,100 in 2007 to $1,753,800 in 2009.
9 The gross profit margin is calculated as [Sales – Cost of Goods Sold] / Sales. The net profit margin is after-tax profits over sales. The net profit margin includes the effects of corporate expenses (corporate level advertising, lease of the corporate offices and the distribution center, and corporate-level SGA).
Ownership and Financing
The initial investments in Teuer came from its two founders and a pool of private investors whom they recruited from the local area and their professional network. The initial round of capital they raised was less than $1 million, but as the business grew, the capital they were required to raise each year grew as well. Teuer raised equity capital from current shareholders on a pro rata basis.10 Teuer continued to raise capital for the first several years, including a $5.7 million equity infusion in 2008 (see Exhibit 7). Fortunately, this was the last time the firm had needed to raise capital, as it has been able to finance its growth internally ever since. The number of shareholders had grown from the original 3 to 187 by the end of 2012.11 The number of shareholders rose due to some shareholders selling their shares to new investors through private transactions and as a result of estate planning, as some shareholders had passed shares along to their children. The firm’s cash flow in excess of its investment needs had been returned to the shareholders each year in the form of dividends.
Valuation Challenge: Financial Forecasting
Forecasting Sales Revenue
Although most of the investors were familiar with the business, Jennifer Jerabek and the finance team needed to assemble a set of forecasts upon which the valuation would be based. The first step was to forecast future income starting with sales revenue. The simplest way to forecast Teuer’s sales revenue would be to look at past sales growth and project this forward. Teuer’s sales growth had declined from triple-digit numbers in its early years to 11 percent in 2012 (see Exhibit 3). Although projecting historic growth rates is common, there were two problems in this case.
The first issue was the effect of showroom openings and maturation. Teuer’s sales growth was a combination of organic growth from the operation of current showrooms and from the opening of new showrooms. The rate of sales growth for each showroom declined as customers became aware of the location (the source of early rapid growth), but this is not apparent in the aggregate data because of the additional sales coming from showroom openings each year. As the rate of openings had differed across the years, the growth in total sales had been affected. A simple solution would be to examine the historic growth of Teuer’s existing showrooms as a function of how long they had been open (the cohort age). This brought Jerabek to her second problem with using historic data: the economy. The recession and subsequent (anemic) recovery meant a simple projection of past showroom levels was not meaningful. Both the number of showrooms opened and their initial success depended upon the economy. Showrooms that opened in 2009 faced much greater headwinds than those opened in 2004. This was why Teuer’s sales growth dropped from 54 percent in 2008 to 15 percent in 2009 before rising back to 23 percent in 2010. The effect of the economy also complicated examining sales growth by cohort (the year in which a showroom was opened). To address these two concerns, Jerabek decided to examine historic sales growth on a cohort basis while adjusting sales growth for growth in total furniture sales in the same year. The data is
10 Thus, when Teuer raised $5,747,115 in 2008, an investor who owned 1 percent of the equity contributed $57,471.15, or 1 percent of $5,747,115.
11 As of the end of 2012, there were 9,945,000 shares outstanding.
presented in Exhibit 8, Panel A.12 Once adjusted sales growth was calculated for each cohort and
year, the pattern of declining sales growth was apparent. Average adjusted sales growth declined
from 70.2 percent the first year a showroom was open to 1.5 percent the sixth year a showroom
was open.13 The average adjusted sales growth figures, along with the projected aggregate growth
of sales (see Exhibit 2), were then used to forecast sales for each cohort through 2018 (see Exhibit 5).14
The final step was to forecast the initial sales of the three showrooms that had opened in 2012 and the six that were expected to open in the next three years. Teuer had an internal model for estimating sales per square foot that depended upon the location of the store, traffic patterns, and local economic conditions (e.g., mean income) that had been developed over the last decade. Based on the firm’s model, the forecasts for sales per square foot were 110.0, 113.2, 116.6, and 119.9 for showrooms opened in 2012, 2013, 2014, and 2015, respectively.
Forecasting Costs
To forecast net income, the finance team first forecast each cost line in the income statement. As with sales growth, the finance team calculated the ratio of costs to sales (CGS, SGA, and advertising).15 When these cost to sales ratios were examined by cohort (as was done with sales), it was apparent that costs fell relative to sales as the showrooms matured, but at different rates. For example, the CGS/sales ratio dropped from 71 percent the first year a showroom was open to 40 percent by the fourth year. A similar pattern was seen for both SGA and advertising, but the effect was less dramatic. SGA (excluding advertising and depreciation) dropped from 19.3 percent of sales the first year a showroom was open to 13.6 percent by the fourth year. Advertising at the showroom level dropped from 10.6 percent to 7.2 percent of sales.16 The showrooms became more efficient as the staff became more experienced and the showroom’s manager developed a better understanding of the exact product mix that appealed to his local customer base. The showrooms advertised more heavily the first year to introduce the new showroom to potential customers. After the fourth year, it was still necessary to advertise but the expenditures declined relative to the larger sales amount.
The final showroom-level expenses were for facilities. Teuer signed a standard six-year lease with landlords. The lease rate was fixed for six years. Historically, the firm had renewed all of its leases and this was expected to continue. The lease rate usually increased when the leases were renegotiated. Depending upon the real estate market, the increase had been greater than or less than
12 For each cohort and each year, sales growth was calculated as the ratio of this year’s sales to last year’s sales. This ratio was then divided by one plus the growth rate of total furniture sales in the same year (from Exhibit 2). As an illustration, the showroom that was opened in 2003 had sales grow from $2,057,000 in 2004 to $3,754,000 in 2005, an increase of 82.5 percent. Total furniture sales grew by 5.17 percent between 2004 and 2005. Thus, the excess growth in sales is calculated as 73.6 percent [(3,754,000 / 2,057,000) / (1 + 0.0517) – 1].
13 Because the finance team had few observations on showrooms open more than six years and the numbers did not seem to vary dramatically, an average adjusted sales growth was calculated for all years beyond the sixth (see Exhibit 8).
14 For example, the two showrooms that opened in 2011 had first-year sales of $3,353,700 (2012). Because total furniture sales were projected to grow by 3 percent in 2013, projected sales for these two showrooms were $5,879,237 [3,353,700 * (1 + 0.702) * (1 + 0.030)].
15 Because the time pattern of advertising and depreciation was different than the other elements of SGA, Teuer broke these two components out separately when reporting costs at the store level. This also increased the accuracy of its cost forecasts.
16 After four years, these cost to sales ratios appeared to have stabilized. Thus, when forecasting CGS, SGA (excluding advertising and depreciation), and advertising after the third year, the average ratio for the fourth year and beyond was used.
the inflation rate over the prior six years of the lease. Because the finance staff did not feel that they could forecast the condition of the real estate market, they forecasted lease rates as rising by 2 percent per year when the leases were renegotiated. The lease rate for the 2012 showrooms had already been negotiated at approximately $20.45/square foot and negotiations for the 2013 leases are nearing completion.17 The lease rate for the 2013 showrooms is expected to be $20.88/square foot. After that lease rates are forecast to rise by 2 percent per year ($21.30/square foot for the 2014 showrooms and $21.72/square foot for the 2015 showrooms) (see Exhibit 5).
In addition to expenses incurred at the individual showrooms, Teuer had a number of corporate- level expenses, including the corporate-level advertising and SGA as well as expenses for Teuer’s distribution center and corporate offices. Each showroom had a budget for local advertising (mainly print and radio advertising). Corporate was responsible for expenditures on TV advertising and for the design and production of all campaigns. Corporate expenses had been larger in Teuer’s early years (9 percent of sales) but had stabilized at 5 percent of sales in recent years, and this rate was expected to continue.
Forecasting Investment: Showroom Improvements and Working Capital
Teuer’s strategy of leasing its showrooms (building and land) meant that it did not need to finance these expenditures. Teuer’s greatest capital investment was in working capital. For a retail chain, especially one focused on always having what the customer desired, large investments in inventory and accounts receivable (AR) were deemed a valuable investment. Jerabek’s method for forecasting net working capital was standard. AR was forecast as a function of sales. As with the cost numbers, the finance team looked for patterns in the data by first calculating historic ratios for each cohort of showrooms. The ratio of AR to sales did not change over time for a cohort and was close to the contractual terms of fourteen weeks that Teuer gave customers to pay (see Exhibit 9). Both inventory and accounts payable were forecast as a function of the next year’s CGS, and because no discernible pattern was seen in the data, an average of each cohort’s year was taken (see Exhibit 9). Teuer carried a large inventory of almost six months of the next year’s sales. As discussed above, the firm paid its suppliers on time, which was an average of sixty days.18
Teuer’s only capital expenditure was the cost of building out the interiors of each showroom. These expenditures were calculated per square foot for each cohort. The cost of constructing the interiors had risen dramatically, as the construction industry had boomed and local construction firms were running at full capacity. Construction of Teuer’s interiors had risen from $20.80/square foot in 2003 to $30.60/square foot in 2007 before falling back to $26.40/square foot in 2012.19 Based on the assumption that the construction industry had right-sized itself, the finance team assumed that the cost of building out the interiors would stay constant in real terms at $26.40/square foot. The construction costs were expected to rise at the rate of inflation (see Exhibit 9). The cost
17 The total lease payment on the three showrooms would thus be $1,000,000 [20.45 = 1,000,000 / (3 * 16,300)].
18 Because inventory, accounts payable, and CGS all depend upon the price paid for merchandise, inventory and accounts payable can be forecast as a function of next year’s CGS. For example, if Teuer purchases a sofa for $1,000, inventory and accounts payable increase by $1,000. When the suppliers are paid, accounts payable and cash both decrease by $1,000. In the future, when the sofa is sold, inventory will be reduced by $1,000 and CGS will be increased by $1,000. Accrued expenses, which are payments to other suppliers, are forecast as a function of the next year’s advertising and SGA (excluding advertising and depreciation). This is another reason why depreciation was broken out separately from SGA. On average, Teuer paid its other suppliers, especially its sales associates and showroom managers, much faster than it paid its furniture suppliers (see Exhibit 9).
19 The real cost had risen from $25.90/square foot in 2003 to $33.50/square foot in 2007 in 2012 dollars (see Exhibit 9).
of building out the interiors was depreciated straight-line over five years as specified by the tax code.
The showrooms’ layouts needed to be “refreshed” periodically. This was more than standard maintenance. From her prior experience, Kim Smithson had learned that if this decision was left to the showroom managers, the expenditures would be made every three to four years, and the effect on sales was not justified by the expense. If the decision was left to the finance staff, it would always be postponed until next year “when the firm could better afford the expenditure.” As a result, she had implemented a policy that the expenditures be scheduled every eight years. Only the first four showrooms had gone through this process by 2012 (the 2003 and 2004 cohorts). These expenditures provided the basis for estimating future expenditures on refreshing the showrooms.20
Valuation of Teuer Furniture
Once the details of the financial forecasting model were constructed, the last step was to build the pro forma income statement and balance sheet for Teuer (see Exhibit 10 for a summary of the main forecasting parameters). These would be the basis of the discounted cash flow valuation of Teuer. Based on the forecasted numbers, it was decided that a six-year forecasting period would be used, so Jerabek’s team needed to forecast the cash flow generated by Teuer from 2013 to 2018. The team was unable to predict the dynamics of the home furnishing in
"Not answered?"
The importance of Information Governance is being realized across all industries
Record inventory is an essential part of any hospital. For the successful functioning of the Hospitals, health records are to be updated continuously. Major updates of the inventory include basic data collection and previous health records of the patients. Record inventory is both paper-based and computer-based to satisfy the hospital’s requirements. It also serves as a foundation to ensure safe and effective service to the clients and is used in developing the plan for managing budgets, maintenance, and finance related to hiring the technical staff. The inventory may also be used to support assessment within the general hospital and to record the receipts, patient records, and finances related to assets. Risk analysis and disaster planning are also supported by record inventory. This research mainly depends on three specific departments which are interconnected.
Records Inventory at City General Hospital
Introduction
This report entails a description of the record inventory that was done at City General hospital. It has various sections that include record inventory, records inventory survey form, who to receive the survey developed, rationale for the questions that were included in the Survey, initial set of interview questions and record retention schedule. It focuses on three departments that include pharmacy, outpatient and general accounts. Information Governance (IG) is a strategic approach to maximizing the value while mitigating the risks associated with creating, using, and sharing enterprise information. It recognizes that information is an organizational asset and as such requires high level coordination and oversight to assure accountability, integrity, appropriate preservation, and protection of enterprise information. The aim of IG is to break down silos and avoid fragmentation in the management of information so that it is trustworthy and that so that organizations experience a real return on the investments they make in the people, processes, and technology used to manage information. Information is an essential resource in any business or organization, without which operations and running the business is not possible. Accordingly, investments are made in people, process, and technology to assure that information can support the business or enterprise. Because of the significant investments associated with creating, using, protecting and sharing information, information should be viewed as a type of organizational asset, not unlike the buildings, equipment and financial resources necessary to run the business.
Record Inventory
The departments that will be considered for the records inventory will be pharmacy, outpatient department and general accounting department. The three departments play a key role in this organization as outpatient department retains data of every patient that has used the hospital facilities. Pharmacy department retains data of medications given to the individual patients prescribe by the physicians. The general account department maintains the record of patient activities and their financial records related to patient. Since this three departments acts as a pillars for City General Hospital. Below is a table that shows the record types, responsible department and the events that caused the creation of the record type.
Pharmacy Department
Pharmacists are required to keep records of the prescriptions for all the prescriptions dispensed and the prescriptions medicines that are supplied. It must have information such as the prescription reference number, amount that is dispensed, date of dispensing as well as the name and the address of the pharmacy. These record types have events that lead to the creation of the record types as indicated in the table below.
Table 1: Record types for Pharmacy Department
Record Types
Responsible Department
Events
Prescription reference Number
Pharmacy Procurement
To enable easy trace of the drugs in a pharmacy.
Amount Dispensed
Pharmacy Department
To enable easy accountability of the amount of drugs those are sold.
Date of dispensing
Pharmacy Department
To determine the exact dates that the drugs in the pharmacy were sold.
Name and Address of the Pharmacy
Pharmacy Department
To enable easier identification of the place where the drugs were purchased.
Outpatient Treatment Department/ Treatment Records Department
Outpatient department is the sections of the hospital that is designed for the treatment of the patients who does not stay in the hospital. The patients get treatment and go home without admission. The record types that are present in the outpatient department include: demographics that contain the age of the patient, place of resident, names, marital status. It also has the vital signs, diagnosis, medication, treatment plans, progress notes, radiology images and laboratory test results. The table below shows the record types, the responsible departments as well as the events that triggered the record types.
Table 2: Record types Treatment Records Department
Record Types
Responsible Department
Events
Demographics
Pharmacy Procurement
To be able to trace the patient and know about the background of the patient.
Vital Signs
Treatment Records department
To know what possible disease the patient could be suffering from.
Diagnosis
Treatment Records Department
Need to know what the patient was diagnosed of.
Medication
Treatment Records Department
Need to know how the patient was treated.
Treatment Plans
Treatment Records Department
Need to know the plan that is there for treating the patients.
Progress notes
Treatment Records Department
Need to know how the patient is progressing.
Radiology images
Radiology Department
Need to examine the images of the patients’ organs for treatment.
Laboratory and Test Results
Laboratory Department
Test and have the history of the tested diseases.
General Accounting Department
Accounting records are any type of information that relates to the financial performance of the company. In the City General hospital, the record types which are available in the general accounts department included general ledger, general journal, cash book records as well as the banking records. The table below illustrates the record types in the general accounting department, the responsible departments as well as the events that triggered the creation of such record types.
Table 3: Record types for General Accounts Department
Record Types
Responsible Department
Events
General Journal
General Accounts Department.
This was created to sort, store an summarize the transactions of a company
General Ledgers
General Accounts Department.
This was created to record the transactions that was relating to adjustment entries, opening stock and the accounting errors.
Cash Book Records
General Accounts Department
The need to know the receipts as well as the payments made in the hospital.
Banking Records
General Accounts Department
To enable trace the bank and credit cards statements, deposit books and bank reconciliations.
Table 3
Record Inventory Survey Form
The departments that were used in the Survey and the interview included: pharmacy department, outpatient department and general accounting department. It has the sections for the department that was mostly accessing the records, the place where the records can be accessed physically (MTAS, 2019).
The system where the records were created and date of creation of the system date last changed (Planning a Health Record Department, 2012). It also indicates whether the record is vital and whether there are duplicate or any other forms of the records.
Pharmacy Department
In the pharmacy department, the department that was able to access the record types was general accounts department and the records department. CRM was used to create the records. The records still can be got physically in the pharmacy. The CRM was first created and installed with the record types for pharmacy on 1.2.2000. It was last changed on 15.12.2108. The records are very vital. Other forms of records are also available.
Table 4: Pharmacy Inventory Survey Form
Record Types
Department Accessing the record
What applications create the record
Where the record is Accessed Physically
Date created
Last changed
Whether it is a vital record
Any forms of record?
Prescription reference Number
General Accounts Department
Customer Relationship Management ( CRM)
Pharmacy
1.2.2000
15.12.2018
Yes
Yes
Amount Dispensed
General Accounts Department
CRM
Pharmacy
1.2.2000
15.12.2018
Yes
Yes
Date of dispensing
General Accounts Department
CRM
Pharmacy
1.2.2000
15.12.2018
Yes
Yes
Name and Address of the Pharmacy
Records Department
CRM
Pharmacy
1.2.2000
15.12.2018
Yes
Yes
Table 4
Outpatient Treatment Department
In the outpatient department, the records that are there can be accessed by the information technology department. The Customer Relationship Management (CRM) was used to create the records. The records can as well be accessed physically at the outpatient department. The CRM was first created and installed with the record types for pharmacy on 2.3.2000. It was last changed on 28.12.2108. The records are very vital. Other forms of records are also available
Table 5: Outpatient treatment Inventory Survey Form
Record Types
Department Accessing the record
What applications create the record
Where the record is Accessed Physically
Date created
Last changed
Whether it is a vital record
Are there any forms of record?
Demographics
All departments
Customer Relationship Management ( CRM)
Outpatient treatment Department
2.3.2000
28.12.2018
Yes
Yes
Vital signs
Information technology
CRM
Outpatient treatment Department
2.3.2000
28.12.2018
Yes
Yes
Diagnosis
Information technology
CRM
Outpatient treatment Department
2.3.2000
28.12.2018
Yes
Yes
Medication
Information technology
CRM
Outpatient treatment Department
2.3.2000
28.12.2018
Yes
Yes
Treatment plans
Information technology
CRM
Outpatient treatment Department
2.3.2000
28.12.2018
Yes
Yes
General Accounting Department
The General accounting inventory survey form is specific to the IT department to store different types of records like Journal, Ledger, Cashbook and Banking Records. This department mainly interacts with patient financials related to patient treatment cost analysis and invoicing. This department has a good track record in using the Customer Relationship Management (CRM) tool to maintain and update the data of their customers. CRM applications was first installed on 1.3.2000 and last modified on 5.1.2019. The table below shows the general accounts department. The records are very vital and other forms of the records are available.
Table 6: General Accounts Inventory Survey Form
Record Types
Department Accessing the record
What applications create the record
Where the record is Accessed Physically
Date created
Last changed
Whether it is a vital record
Are there any forms of record?
General Journal
Information Technology
Customer Relationship Management ( CRM)
General Accounts Department
1.3.2000
5.1.2019
Yes
Yes
General Ledger
Information Technology
CRM
General Accounts Department
1.3.2000
5.1.2019
Yes
Yes
Cash Book Records
Information Technology
CRM
General Accounts Department
1.3.2000
5.1.2019
Yes
Yes
Banking Records
Information Technology
CRM
General Accounts Department
1.3.2000
5.2.2019
Yes
Yes
Table 6
Who to receive the survey developed
The head of the Information Management at City General hospital will receive the survey that was developed and will dispatch the survey forms to pharmacy, outpatient and general accounts departmental heads. He would be responsible for compiling the reports on the surveys. The surveys are majorly developed to collect and disseminate accurate, representative data that can explain the health conditions in the hospitals.
Rationale for the questions that were included in the survey
The survey had various questions that were from the three departments. They were included on the basis of the record types that are available in the various departments at the City General hospital. The questions were considered to be relevant as they will be useful in monitoring the performance of the various departments.
The questions that were selected were based on the gap that is available in the various departments of the hospitals so that a possible solution can be sought to solve the problems that might occur.
Initial set of interview questions
The set of the interview questions that are developed to follow the survey questions included the following:
Outpatient Department Interview Questions
· Do the nurses treat with courtesy and respect?
· Do the nurses listen carefully?
· Do the nurses explain things in an understandable way?
· Do the doctors treat with courtesy?
· Do the Doctors listen carefully?
· Do the doctors explain things in an understandable way
· Is the outpatient department clean?
· Are the bathrooms and latrines clean?
· Is there enough time to discuss the medical problem with the doctor or nurse?
Pharmacy Department Interview Questions
· Do the pharmacists read well the prescriptions?
· Do the pharmacists give patients correct drugs?
· Is the pharmacy clean at all times?
· How long does each pharmacist serve each patient?
· Does the pharmacy stock all types of drugs?
General Accounts Interview Questions
· Does the account department bank all the cash they receive from the patients?
· Does the book of account at the department balance?
· How does the patients’ pay their money?
· Who much does the hospital receive per day?
Record Retention Schedule
This is a document that provides a mandatory instruction for the disposition of records that involves the transfer of records and that are permanent as well as disposal of temporary records. When the hospital no longer needs the records, the data should be removed (Achampong, 2012).
Records retention is the continued storage of the data of an organization for the purposes of compliance as well as for the business purposes. It has the policies that describe well which data should be archived and the duration in which it should be kept. The table describes the length of the time the data will be retained as an active record, the reason for the disposal of the data as well as the final disposition. The length of time the records retained in three different selected departments are listed as minimum seven to ten years, because the patient may have had done the entire body checkup and physician has noticed a minor disease which can affect the patient majorly after few years. Therefore surgeon or physician needs to have the past several years of patient health and medication history to understand and start the treatment. For this reason, there should be a proper data retention and governance policies in place.
Table 7: Records retention schedule table
Records
Length of time they will be retained as an active record
Reason for disposal
Final Disposition
Pharmacy Records
10 years
Legal and Fiscal
Archival
Outpatient Records
7 years
Legal, Historical and Fiscal
Archival
General Accounts Records
10 years
Legal, Historical and Fiscal
Destruction
Table 7
Legal Requirements and Compliance Considerations
The hospitals have been advised by lawyers to maintain the legal records permanently since these records are important in cases of litigation as well as the government investigation. The records retention schedule should be well developed in a systematic manner; the schedule must cover all the records that include all the reproductions (Akyut & Jürgen, 2008). The hospitals have to comply with the policies that are in place that related to the duration in which every data should be retained in the hospital as active record and to dispose the data when it is required to do so.
Recently, Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) have given various guidelines to ensure protected health information (PHI) is secured and private. This regulation helps to protect the data of the customer which is store in the computer to take necessary installations of firewalls and anti-virus software, take a constant backup of all present records in various departments to make sure the active compliance is met abiding the laws requirements (Jim, 2016).
Conclusion
In any hospital, any simple ignorance is the choice of life or death for their patients. With high pressure for perfect operations, an Record Inventory is essential. A record inventory provides access to critical information which is important resource in hospitals. The need is important in an industry where operations are complex and record values change frequently. So, Record Inventory in General Hospitals is important is scalable to best fit the needs.
References
Achampong, E.K. (2012). Electronic Health Record System: A Survey in Ghanaian Hospitals. Hospital Pharmacy Management, 4(1). (pp. 1-4). Retrieved from http://dx.doi.org/10.4172/scientificreports.164
Aykut, M.U., & Jürgen, S. (2008). Value of electronic patient record: An Analysis of the Literature. Journal of Biomedical Informatics, 41(4), (pp. 675-678). Retrieved from https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbi.2008.02.001
Jim, G. (2016). Hospital Security: Structure of HIPAA Compliance. Victory Security. Retrieved from https:// M. (2015). The Importance of Health Record. Scientific Research Publishing, 7 (5). (pp. 617-627). Retrieved from http://dx.doi.org/10.4236/health.2015.75073
Planning a Health Record Department. (2012). Education Module for Health Record Practice. Retrieved from https://ifhima.files.wordpress.com/2014/08/module-8-planning-a-health-record-dept.pdf.
Record Inventory Worksheet, MTAS. (2019). Institute for Public Service, Knoxville, TN. Retrieved from https:// to work on Phase 3
INSTRUCTIONS FOR PHASE III
During residency weekend your team worked on an outline for an overall Information Governance
Plan/Program for the hospital. It is your task to now add the “content” to the outline for the Information Governance Plan/Program. That is you are to prepare an Information Governance Policy/Program for CITY GENERAL HOSPITAL. All IG policies or programs are somewhat different and unique to the industry and to the organization. There are a number of sample Information Governance Policy/Program templates and samples on the internet. Attached to the end of this document is a sample Information Governance Policy template that was copied verbatim from the website https://
Please feel free to browse the internet to get a flavor for what an actual IG Policy/Program might look like. If you desire, use the template attached to the end of this document as an outline for how you might choose to format your IG Policy/Program for CITY GENERAL HOSPITAL and what you might want to include in your IG policy/program. Alternatively, you may use the outline for the IG Plan that your team developed during residency weekend. You may also use the work the group performed during residence weekend as a “starting point” for developing your own IG plan, if you liked portions of what the group did but believe it still needs work.
It is certainly not a requirement that you use the attached sample as a guideline for formatting your own, or that you use anything that your team prepared during residency weekend. It makes no difference how you arrived at the final format for the IG Plan that you submit as long as you give credit to all source(s), if any, that you looked to in formulating your IG Plan or any portion of your plan.
You may determine that you have developed on your own something superior to the outline herein below, the outline developed by your team during residency weekend, and anything you have found as part of your research. If that is the case, then use your own model! The sample at the
end of this document is merely attached for your convenience as one example of what might be contained in your IG policy/program, and in what format. Do as much research from all sources you have access to or can locate to determine how you want to format your own IG Policy/program, and the types of things you will include. If you decide to use the attached sample, or the outline created by your group during residency weekend, still you are required to customize them to meet the distinct characteristics and needs of CITY GENERAL HOSPITAL and to add the detail required. Please know, this assignment DOES NOT consist of submitting an outline as you did during residency weekend. This assignment is to submit “THE” Information Governance Plan for CITY GENERAL HOSPITAL.
Please do not misconstrue the sample/example format attached hereto or the outline that your team developed during residency weekend. Both are merely outlines. They are skeletons that contain only headings for the types of things you will discuss as part of your IG Plan. In this assignment, you must include actual content or provide instruction for each section listed, and include your own additional subsections where appropriate. For example, you will see on one portion of the attached example the following:
Roles and Responsibilities
The first major section of most frameworks clearly define key roles and their responsibilities, including:
Information Governance Committee Information Governance Team Information Risk Management Information Asset Management Records Manager
Line-of-Business Managers Employees
“Roles and Responsibilities” is merely a category or heading for one portion of the IG policy/program. The sentence that reads, “The first major section of most frameworks clearly define key roles and their responsibilities including:” is nothing more than an instruction from me to you describing the section. Then the 7 lines that follow is just an example of the key players for this particular example. In your IG Plan that you submit to me, if you have a section that looks like this, then you must also include a description of the roles and responsibilities for each entity/position described herein above. You will not include in your IG policy/program that you turn in to me the descriptions of what each category is used for, which is what I gave to you through what was intended to be nothing more than a “tip” to you on what to put in that section.
Please remember that I said I want you to use sentence form. Please don’t just give me listings like that which is included in the outline for Roles and Responsibility example abov
"Not answered?"
Anaya “Mental Illness on Television,”
Anaya “Mental Illness on Television,” reflects that while media is doing better about providing characters who have physical disabilities, those with mental illness don’t fare as well. The media seems to exploit those with mental illnesses as being the motive for crimes against themselves and others. Read the various drafts in our Bedford Reader (pp. 53-60). In what way do you see her changing her essay by revising the drafts until that final one?
Replies to Classmates: How does her focus improve in the drafts? What can you learn about revising your own work from this?
AN ESSAY-IN-PROGRESS In the following pages, you have a chance to follow Rosie Anaya as she develops an essay through journal writing and several drafts. She began the writing process early, while reading and annotating Nancy Mairs’s “Disability” (p. 12). Inspired by Mairs’s argument, Anaya writes about another group that has been “effaced” by the media. Discovering Ideas and Drafting Journal Notes on Reading Haven’t the media gotten better about showing people with disabilities since Mairs wrote this essay? Lots of TV shows have characters who just happen to use wheelchairs. But I see why she has a problem: I would be bothered, too, if I didn’t see people like me represented. I would feel left out, probably hurt, maybe angry. Mairs is doing more: Invisibility is a problem for healthy people too — anybody could become disabled and wouldn’t know that people with disabilities live full, normal lives. Interesting that she mentions emotions so many times: The references to feelings and psychology raise a question about people with mental disabilities, like depression or schizophrenia. How are they represented by the media? Definitely not as regular people: Stories in the news about emotionally disturbed people who go over the edge and hurt or even kill people. And Criminal Minds etc. always using some kind of psychological disorder to explain a crime. Except the problem with mental illness isn’t just invisibility — it’s negative stereotyping. What if you’re represented as a danger to yourself and others? That’s got to be worse. First Draft Nancy Mairs is upset with television and movies that don’t show physical disability as a feature of normal life. She says the media shows disability consuming a character’s life or it doesn’t show disability at all, and she wants to see “representations of myself in the media, especially television” (p. no.). Mairs makes a convincing argument that the media should portray physical disability as part of everyday life because “effacement” leaves the rest of us unprepared to cope in the case that we should eventually become disabled ourselves. As she explains it, anybody could become disabled, but because we rarely see people with disabilities living full, normal lives on tv, we assume that becoming disabled means life is pretty much over (p. no.). It’s been three decades since Mairs wrote her essay, and she seems to have gotten her wish. Plenty of characters on television today who have a disability are not defined by it. But psychological disabilities are disabilities too, and they have never been shown “as a normal characteristic, one that complicates but does not ruin human existence” (p. no.). Television routinely portrays people with mental illness as threats to themselves and to others. Think about all those stories on the evening news about a man suffering from schizophrenia who went on a shooting spree before turning his gun on himself, or a mother who drowned her own children in the throes of depression, or a bipolar teenager who commits suicide. Such events are tragic, no doubt, but although the vast majority of people with these illnesses hurt nobody, the news implies that they’re all potential killers. Fictional shows, too, are always using some kind of psychological disorder to explain why someone committed a crime. On Criminal Minds a woman with “intermittent explosive disorder” impulsively kills multiple people after she is released from a psychiatric hospital and stops taking her medication. On Rizzoli and Isles a serial abductor’s actions are blamed on “a long history of mental illness” that started with depression after he saw his father kill his mother and developed a perverse need to recreate their relationship with victims of his own. And the entire premise of Dexter is that the trauma of witnessing his mother’s brutal murder turned the title character into a serial killer. Dexter is an obsessive-compulsive killer who justifies his impulses by killing only other killers. Early in the series, viewers learned that his nemesis, the “Ice Truck Killer,” who at one point was engaged to Dexter’s adopted sister and then tried to kill her, was actually his long-lost brother. Every season featured a different enemy, and each one of them had some kind of stated or implied mental illness: The “Doomsday Killer” of season six, for example, was a psychotic divinity student who went off his meds and suffered from delusions.
It is my belief that the presentation of psychological disability may do worse than the “effacement” of disability that bothered Mairs. People with mental illness are discouraged from seeking help and are sent deeper into isolation and despair. This negative stereotype hurts us all.
Revising
Anaya’s first draft was a good start. She found an idea worth pursuing and explored her thoughts. But as with any first draft, her essay needed work. To improve it, Anaya revised extensively, cutting digressions in some places and adding support in others. Her revised draft, you’ll see, responds to “Disability” more directly, spells out Mairs’s points and Anaya’s own ideas in more detail, and builds more thoroughly on what Mairs had to say.
Revised Draft
Mental Illness on Television
Uses a less abrupt, more formal tone.
In her essay “Disability” Nancy Mairs is upset with argues that television and movies that don’t fail to show physical disability as a feature of normal life.
Deletes a quotation to remove a side issue and tighten the introduction.
She Instead, Mairs says, the media shows disability consuming a character’s life or it doesn’t show disability at all, and she wants to see “representations of myself in the media, especially television” (p. no. 13). But Mairs wrote her essay in 1987. Since then the situation has actually improved for physical disability.
Adds a thesis statement.
At the same time, another group — those with mental illness — have come to suffer even worse representation.
Explains Mairs’s idea more clearly.
Mairs makes a convincing argument Mairs’s purpose in writing her essay was to persuade her readers that the media should portray physical disability as part of everyday life because “effacement” otherwise it denies or misrepresents disability, and it leaves the rest of us “Temporarily Abled Persons” (those without disability, for now) unprepared to cope in the case that we they should eventually become disabled ourselvesthemselves (14-15).
Provides page numbers in Mairs’s essay.
As she explains it, anybody could become disabled, but because we rarely see people with disabilities living full, normal lives on tv, we assume that becoming disabled means life is pretty much over (p. no.). It’s been three decades since Mairs wrote her essay, and Three decades later, Mairs she seems to have gotten her wish. Plenty of characters on television today who have a disability are not defined by it.
Adds examples to support the assertion about TV today.
Lawyer and superhero Matt Murdoch on Daredevil is blind. Daphne Vasquez on Switched at Birth (as well as many of her friends and their parents) is deaf. Security analyst Patton Plame of NCIS: New Orleans uses a wheelchair equipped with a computer to help his team solve crimes, Joe Swanson of Family Guy is also paraplegic. A current ad campaign for TJ Maxx features a wheelchair dance team, and Amy Purdy, an athlete with two prosthetic feet, is featured on a TV spot for Toyota. The media still has a long way to go in representing physical disability, but it has made progress.
Adds a transition to tighten the connection with Mairs’s essay.
However, the media depiction of one type of disability is, if anything, worse than it was three decades ago. Although Mairs doesn’t address mental illness in “Disability,” mental illness falls squarely into the misrepresentation she criticizes. But pPsychological disabilities are disabilities too, and but they have never been shown “as a normal characteristic, one that complicates but does not ruin human existence” (p. no. 15).
More fully develops the idea about mental illness as a “normal characteristic.”
People who cope with a disability such as depression, bipolar disorder, or obsessive-compulsive disorder as parts of their lives do not see themselves in the media; those who don’t have a psychological disability now but may someday do not see that mental illness is usually a condition they can live with.
Adds a transition to link back to Mairs and the thesis.
The depictions of mental illness actually go beyond Mairs’s concerns, as the media actually exploits it.Television routinely portrays people with mental illness as threats to themselves and to others. Think about all those stories on the evening news about a man suffering from schizophrenia who went on a shooting spree before turning his gun on himself, or a mother who drowned her own children in the throes of depression, or a bipolar teenager who commits suicide. Such events are tragic, no doubt, but although the vast majority of people with these illnesses hurt nobody, the news implies that they’re all potential killers.
Combines related paragraphs (“Fictional shows” used to start a new paragraph).
Fictional shows, too, are always using some kind of psychological disorder to explain why someone committed a crime. On Criminal Minds a woman with “intermittent explosive disorder” impulsively kills multiple people after she is released from a psychiatric hospital and stops taking her medication., and Oon Rizzoli and Isles a serial abductor’s actions are blamed on “a long history of mental illness” beginning that started with depression. after he saw his father kill his mother and developed a perverse need to recreate their relationship with victims of his own. And the entire premise of Dexter is that the trauma of witnessing his mother’s brutal murder turned the title character into a serial killer.
Removes digressions and simplifies examples to improve unity.
Dexter is an obsessive-compulsive killer who justifies his impulses by killing only other killers. Early in the series, viewers learned that his nemesis, the “Ice Truck Killer,” who at one point was engaged to Dexter’s adopted sister and then tried to kill her, is actually his long-lost brother. Every season has featured a different enemy, and each one of them has had some kind of stated or implied mental ilness: The “Doomsday Killer” of season six, for example, was a psychotic divinity student who went off his meds and suffered from delusions.
Expands paragraph to link to Mairs’s essay and lend authority to Anaya’s point.
These programs highlight mental illness to get viewers’ attention. But the media is also telling us that the proper response to people with mental illness is to be afraid of them. Mairs argues that invisibility in the media can cause people with disabilities to feel unattractive or inappropriate (14). It is my belief that the presentation of psychological disability may do worse. than the “effacement” of disability that bothered Mairs. People with mental illness are discouraged from seeking help and are sent deeper into isolation and despair. Those feelings are often cited as the fuel for violent outbursts, but ironically the media portrays such violence as inevitable with mental illness. This negative stereotype hurts us all.
Provides a new conclusion that explains why the topic is important and ends with a flourish.
More complex and varied depictions of all kinds of impairments, both physical and mental, will weaken the negative stereotypes that are harmful to all of us. With mental illness especially, we would all be better served if psychological disability was portrayed by the media as a part of everyday life. It’s not a crime.
Add
Works Cited
- “Breath Play.” Criminal Minds, season 10, episode 17, CBS, 11 Mar. 2015. Netflix, Accessed 19 July 2015.
- “Deadly Harvest.” Rizzoli and Isles, season 6, episode 3, TNT, 23 July 2015.
- Mairs, Nancy. “Disability.” The Bedford Reader, edited by X. J. Kennedy et al., 13th ed., Bedford/St. Martin’s, 2017, pp. 12-15.
- TJ Maxx. Advertisement. Fox, 21 July 2015.
- Toyota. Advertisement. TNT, 23 July 2015.
Editing
With her thesis clarified, the connections between her argument and Mairs’s tightened, and her ideas more fully developed, Anaya was satisfied that her essay was much improved and just about finished. She still had some work to do, though. In editing, she corrected errors, cleaned up awkward sentences, and added explanations. Here we show you her changes to one paragraph.
Edited Paragraph
Reduces wordiness; corrects tense shift.
Mairs’s purpose in writing her essay “Disability” was is to persuade her readers that the media should portray physical disability as part of everyday life because otherwise it denies they deny or misrepresents disability,and it leaves “Temporarily Abled Persons” (those without disability, for now) unprepared to cope in the case that they should eventually if they become disabled themselves (14-15).
Corrects pronoun-antecedent and subject-verb agreement (media is plural).
Reduces wordiness.
Three decades later, Mairs seems to have gotten her wish. Plenty of for characters on television today who have a disability but are not defined by it.
Adds coordination for emphasis.
Reduces wordiness.
Lawyer and superhero Matt Murdoch on Daredevil is blind. Daphne Vasquez Several characters on Switched at Birth (as well as many of her friends and their parents) is are deaf. Security analyst Patton Plame of NCIS: New Orleans uses a wheelchair equipped with a computer to help his team solve crimes,.
Fixes comma splice.
Police officer Joe Swanson of Family Guy is also paraplegic.
Eliminates passive voice and creates parallelism.
A current ad campaign for TJ Maxx features a wheelchair dance team, and Amy Purdy, an athlete with two prosthetic feet, is featured on a TV spot for Toyota highlights Amy Purdy, an athlete with two prosthetic feet.
Corrects subject-verb and pronoun-antecedent agreement.
s a list of works cited. (See pp. 635–45.)
The media still has have a long way to go in representing physical disability, but it has they have made progress.
Final Draft
Mental Illness on Television
Introduction summarizes Mairs’s essay and sets up Anaya’s thesis.
In her essay “Disability,” Nancy Mairs argues that the media, such as television and movies, fail to show physical disability as a feature of normal life. Instead, Mairs says, they show disability consuming a character’s life or they don’t show disability at all. Mairs wrote her essay in 1987, and since then the situation has actually improved for depiction of physical disability. At the same time, another group — those with mental illness — has come to suffer even worse representation.
Thesis statement establishes Anaya’s main idea.
Mairs’s purpose in “Disability” is to persuade readers that the media should portray physical disability as part of everyday life because otherwise they deny or misrepresent disability and leave “Temporarily Abled Persons” (those without disability, for now) unprepared to cope if they become disabled (14-15).
Page numbers in parentheses refer to “Works Cited” at end of paper.
Three decades later, Mairs seems to have gotten her wish for characters who have a disability but are not defined by it. Lawyer and superhero Matt Murdoch on Daredevil is blind. Several characters on Switched at Birth are deaf.
Examples provide support for Anaya’s analysis.
Security analyst Patton Plame of NCIS: New Orleans uses a wheelchair equipped with a computer to help his team solve crimes. Police officer Joe Swanson of Family Guy is also paraplegic. A current ad campaign for TJ Maxx features a wheelchair dance team, and a TV spot for Toyota highlights Amy Purdy, an athlete with two prosthetic feet. The media still have a long way to go in representing physical disability, but they have made progress.
Comparison and contrast extend Mairs’s idea to Anaya’s new subject.
However, in depicting one type of disability, the media are, if anything, worse than they were three decades ago. Mairs doesn’t address mental illness, but it falls squarely into the misrepresentation she criticizes. It has never been shown, in Mairs’s words, “as a normal characteristic, one that complicates but does not ruin human existence” (15).
Foll
Thus people who cope with a psychological disability such as depression, bipolar disorder, or obsessive-compulsive disorder as part of their lives do not see themselves in the media. And those who don’t have a psychological disability now but may someday do not see that mental illness is usually a condition one can live with.
Topic sentence introduces new idea.
Unfortunately, the depictions of mental illness also go beyond Mairs’s concerns, because the media actually exploit it. Television routinely portrays people with mental illness as threats to themselves and to others.
Examples provide evidence for Anaya’s point.
TV news often features stories about a man suffering from schizophrenia who goes on a shooting spree before turning his gun on himself, a mother with depression who drowns her own children, or a teenager with bipolar disorder who commits suicide. Fictional programs, especially crime dramas, regularly use mental illness to develop their plots. On Criminal Minds a woman with “intermittent explosive disorder” impulsively kills multiple people after she is released from a psychiatric hospital and stops taking her medication, and on Rizzoli and Isles a serial abductor’s actions are blamed on “a long history of mental illness” beginning with depression. These programs and many others like them highlight mental illness to get viewers’ attention, and they strongly imply that the proper response is fear.
Paraphrase explains one of Mairs’s points in Anaya’s own words.
Mairs argues that the invisibility of physical disability in the media can cause people with disabilities to feel unattractive or inappropriate (14), but the presentation of psychological disability may do worse.
Cause-and-effect analysis applies Mairs’s idea to Anaya’s thesis.
It can prevent people with mental illness from seeking help and send them deeper into isolation and despair. Those feelings are often cited as the fuel for violent outbursts, but ironically the media portray such violence as inevitable with mental illness.
Conclusion reasserts the thesis and explains the broader implications of the subject.
Seeing more complex and varied depictions of people living with all kinds of impairments, physical and mental, can weaken the negative stereotypes that are harmful to all of us. With mental illness especially, we would all be better served if the media would make an effort to portray psychological disability as a part of everyday life, not a crime.
List of “Works Cited” at the end of the paper gives complete publication information for Anaya’s sources. (See pp. 635–45.)
ow-up
Works Cited
- “Breath Play.” Criminal Minds, season 10, episode 17, CBS, 11 Mar. 2015. Netflix, Accessed 19 July 2015.
- “Deadly Harvest.” Rizzoli and Isles, season 6, episode 3, TNT, 23 July 2015.
- Mairs, Nancy. “Disability.” The Bedford Reader, edited by X. J. Kennedy et al., 13th ed., Bedford/St. Martin’s, 2017, pp. 12-15.
- TJ Maxx. Advertisement. Fox, 21 July 2015.
- Toyota. Advertisement. TNT, 23 July 2015.
comments explain what the quotation contributes to Anaya’s thesis.
"Not answered?"
Accor: Strengthening the Brand with Digital Marketing
Accor: Strengthening the Brand with Digital Marketing. Accor, a leading global hotel operator with a portfolio of 14 hospitality brands (including Sofitel,Novotel, and ibis) in 92 countries, prided itself on living up to its motto, “To open new frontiers in hospitality.” In early 2015, Accor was indeed contemplating how to do just that, but not by tackling a new frontier of the geographic variety. Rather, the firm was further exploring the digital frontier via a new distribution channel that would allow it to better compete in the online market space for travel reservations. Room Key had been founded by a consortium of six major hotel brands in January 2012 with the objective of offering hotels and their guests an alternative to third-party booking services such as the major online travel agencies (OTAs). These equity owners sought to lower the cost of booking commissions paid to OTAs, such as Expedia, Priceline, and Booking.com. Customers could search for room options on the Roomkey.com portal and, when finding a suitable choice, be taken directly to the brand or property website to make their booking.
Unlike traditional OTAs that spent heavily on marketing to drive traffic to their sites, Room Key targeted travel shoppers who abandoned their search without booking a room. Via a pop-under ad that redirected them to the Room Key site, the company tried to reengage prospective customers as they were departing from the six founders’ websites. Customers were offered the opportunity to conveniently search and shop hotel rooms from a curated list of trusted brands and then book a room directly with them. Accor faced two options: becoming an equity partner in Room Key, whichrequired a large upfront investment likely to be in the range of €10 million, but provided the opportunity to share in Room Key’s profits, or signing on as a commercial partner, which would require the company to pay Room Key a 15% commission on each booking than the 10% that equity partners paid. With the choice of either option, Accor would incur costs to develop new online infrastructure, to communicate with individual properties, and to change its marketing messages to consumers. Would the savings in fees that Room Key promised when compared with fees charged by OTAs cover these costs and generate additional revenue by attracting new customers to its hotels?
The Room Key opportunity needed to be assessed as part of Accor’s larger digital distribution ecosystem that included the company’s central corporate portal AccorHotels.com; its 14 individualbranded websites, such as Novotel.com; its mobile applications; and its indirect online distributionagreements with OTAs. A new initiative, termed “Digital Hospitality,” a five-year €225 millioninvestment in technology, had been launched in late 2014 and was expected to bear fruit as early as 2015. It reflected the accelerated pace of technological change in the hospitality industry and in thelives of its consumers. In 2014, his first year at the helm, the company’s chairman and CEO, SébastienBazin, a former private equity specialist, had firmly placed digital at the heart of his corporatestrategy. Said Bazin, “In this industry, those who master digital will win. We see digital not as a threat but as a massive opportunity.”1 Digital Hospitality was a significant investment, and Accor’smanagement team had big aspirations for it. If and how Room Key would fit with the new initiative was uncertain. Did Accor need Room Key or could it do digital itself? What would it take for Accor tomaster digital, and at which points in the customer’s purchase journey could digital become acompetitive advantage for the company?
Company History
Accor traced its origins to a single hotel, called Novotel, which was built in 1967 by Paul Dubruleand Gérard Pélisson in Lille Lesquin, France. They soon formed the Société d’investissement et d’exploitation hoteliers (SIEH) group and grew the company rapidly. By 1980, Dubrule and Pélisson had opened or acquired a wide spectrum of hotel brands participating in several market segments, from economy hotels (e.g., ibis) to luxury hotels (e.g., Sofitel). In 1983, with a portfolio of 400 hotels and 1,500 restaurants that employed over 35,000 people in 45 countries, the hoteliers formed Accor
By 2014, Accor managed 14 global brands, with 5 product offerings in the economy segment, 4 in the midscale segment, 4 in the upscale segment, and 3 in the luxury segment; Sofitel represented the pinnacle of the brand portfolio. These brands were distributed over six continents and lent their names to 3,717 hotels with 482,000 rooms.2
Beginning in 2010, Accor began a process of strategic reorganization, gradually changing its focusfrom owning hotel properties toward franchising and management contracts. This “asset-light”strategy revitalized Accor by freeing up capital and allowing it to focus on its strengths as an operator. Instead of making capital investments in hotel real estate, the company pivoted to investing in its brands and its management practices. The company was organized into two businesses. Hotel Invest was a real estate investment business that focused on owning and leasing hotel assets. Hotel Services was an operating business that specialized in running hotel operations for both Accor- owned and other-owned properties. The 3,717 properties managed by Accor’s Hotel Services divisiongenerated €11.9 billion in gross revenue in 2014, up 3% versus the previous year. Accor earned €1.2billion in net revenue from these sales, representing the amount the company earned in the form of management and franchising fees.3
Being asset-light did not mean shrinking Accor’s market footprint; to the contrary, the companyplanned to expand aggressively by adopting a brand-centric strategy to define and develop each of its 14 brands. Even while divesting company-owned real estate, Accor opened 208 new hotels with 30,000 rooms in 2014 and had 156,000 new rooms in the pipeline, 84% of which were in emerging markets.4
A Changing Industry
The hospitality business wasn’t getting any easier. Major brands were engaged in hand-to-hand combat for every room night, and an explosion of new hotel concepts was challenging legacy brands. Emerging competitors, such as Airbnb, were disrupting the industry by booking rooms in private residences. Initially a threat in the leisure travel segment, these new sharing-economy companies were gaining share among business travelers. OTAs continued to increase their share of hotel bookings and were having the effect of commoditizing the category by taking the focus away frombrands and creating a sense among consumers that “a room is a room.” Consumer-generated reviews on sites such as TripAdvisor counterbalanced this trend and provided consumers with valuableinformation about a hotel’s quality. Expedia’s pending acquisitions of competitors Orbitz andTravelocity would bring three of the top four OTAs together and consolidate its power.
Online sites, such as Hotel Tonight, were retraining consumers to wait until the last minute to book a room and were leading a race to the bottom on pricing. Meta-search sites, such as Trivago, scraped and aggregated hotel-booking data from 261 different sources to offer consumers a full menuof options to browse. Major online powerhouses were entering the industry. Google’s investment inITA, a provider of flight information, and licensing partnership with Room77, a hotel-booking software company, showed its increasing interest in the sector. Amazon Travel allowed customers tobook hotel rooms via the U.S.’s largest Internet retailer, while Alibaba’s Taobao Travel was booking airline and accommodation reservations on China’s largest e-commerce site.
Nearly every touch point along a customer’s purchase journey was under attack from new types of competitors. “There are many new participants in the value chain and every one of them is trying to eat some of the cake,” proclaimed Bazin. “Digital is probably the thing that will most determinetomorrow’s winners and losers in our industry.”5 Vivek Badrinath, the digital CEO at Accor, continued:
The first wave was the online travel agents and to a large extent they captured a big part of the value chain. ……And then hoteliers didn’t do much about the second wave— TripAdvisor and the metasearch engines. The third wave is coming and it’s this Airbnbconcept of a customer-to-customer type relationship with a platform in the middle. These are all disruptions of the business model, and that is accelerating.6
[The hotel industry] is highly intensive in technology ……but has been largely passive in this area. . . . New players have appeared over the years—online travel agents, comparison websites, meta search companies and also companies like Airbnb—and in all these cases the hotel companies have not been active in this transformation. We need to become actors of this digital growth.7
OTAs were both a blessing and a curse to hoteliers. Hotels provided the largest revenue stream for OTAs and thus were important partners. Explained Badrinath:
We have a special and privileged relationship with the OTAs, with all hotels……benefiting from this partnership. They help us to tap into new customer bases in certain parts of the world where we do not have such a prominent presence. The cost of their services is quite high and we tend to use them for new customer acquisition, after which we then try to keep [customers] within the Accor ecosystem for subsequent bookings.
Online travel agencies have gained huge power because they have bought a lot of key words, they have invested in building a large catalogue, and they continue to spend a significant part of their revenue on key words. . . . They are very dynamic and are growing very fast. And they are an expensive channel so understanding and balancing what you have from an OTA to deliver on your own is a key challenge for our industry.9
At present, 35% of Accor’s sales were generated online. Of this, the company maintained a nearly 60/40 relationship between direct (obtained via its own websites and earned through its digital efforts) and indirect bookings (those obtained via partnerships with OTAs).10 The company attempted to use OTAs strategically as new customer acquisition engines. It abhorred having to pay OTAs commissions on existing Accor customers who were booking new stays at Accor hotels on siteslike Expedia or Travelocity. “It’s that balance we’re trying to achieve, rather than [working in]opposition with the OTAs,” Badrinath explained.11 As such, the company was increasing its efforts to sign up customers for its loyalty program, Le Club Accorhotels, which currently had 18 million members, 4 million of whom joined in 2014. Only 24% of loyalty program participants booked directly through Accor, which Bazin saw as a huge opportunity to tip the balance of direct to indirect sales further in favor of the company.12 When participants booked through a third party such as an OTA, they did not earn loyalty points that earned them room upgrades and complimentary services during their stay, so booking direct improved the value proposition for consumers. Explained Badrinath:
What we’re really trying to do is make sure [loyal customers] think of us first. And that works—it’s not just a pipe dream. Our loyal customers largely book direct becausethey would rather benefit from the advantages that come with being a loyal customer.It’s more important to us that our loyal customers have that reflex [to book
direct]. The OTAs are bringing us the first-timers, and it’s our job to make sure thatthose first-timers get to like our brand and . . . become loyal customers.13
“Absolutely I still believe OTAs eat too much,” said Bazin, “but Accor is growing and is in aposition to recalculate the value we can provide against that of the OTAs.”14 He continued, “OTAsare a great innovation, but if you are big enough, and Accor is, you have to control your destinations.”
Accor’s Digital Hospitality Program
Part of the way Accor controlled its own bookings was through its owned digital footprint that attracted customers directly to the company. The company acknowledged a sea change in customer relations brought about by the digital revolution, which was changing how industry players related to one another as well as how consumers engaged with hotels. The use of branded websites and mobile applications enabled hotel brands to create direct, long-lasting ties with their guests. Accor was investing heavily in its electronic assets to cement a digital presence that worked to connect with customers in a meaningful way.
In 2014, the company reported that €2.1 billion of its total revenue was derived from bookings made on Accor’s own websites.16 One booking was made every two seconds on an Accor website. The company drove traffic to its websites by purchasing 12 million keywords and paid search ads. It also sent 570 million targeted e-mails each year and managed a Facebook presence that garnered 310,000 fans. Online bookings accounted for 35% of total sales in 2014, driven by 200 million unique visitors to the AccorHotel.com central portal and the websites of its brands, and the company hoped to increase that percentage to 50%.17 “This [growth] will be driven not only by the general trend
towards digitalization in the market, but also by our investment in our own state of the art tools, in particular our multi-brand portal AccorHotels.com,” proclaimed Badrinath.18 He continued:
Since Sébastien Bazin took leadership as the CEO of the company last year, one of the major areas he felt Accor needed to focus on was digital, particularly due to the impact this has on distribution. Digital was largely seen defensively, as an issue to deal with the rise of online travel agents and the changing patterns of customer behaviour. But we felt it was more than that We start with the idea that digital is here to stay; it has a lot ofimpact on our customers’ lives. It has an impact on the way they behave, the way they interact, the way they make decisions, and it changes their behaviour.19
Today’s world has become increasingly digital, which has a massive effect on howcustomers behave. In particular, they are better connected and better informed, with the explosion in information available over digital channels giving them access to a wider variety of options. Switching between brands is now also easier than ever, because they can get a feel of a brand just by surfing the web. Lastly, they place a lot of trust in otherpeoples’ opinions, in particular their personal and professional networks, a process thathas been simplified by the growth in social networks. These behaviors have had a huge impact on how customers interact with and book hotels, prompting us to relook at how we manage every stage of the customer journey—from dreaming and selecting the ideal property through the pre-stay and stay, and ultimately how we facilitate post-stay interactions. Our objective is to rethink the way in which we work with the customer and incorporate digital technology where appropriate to give them a better experience where ever possible.20
Accor’s Digital Hospitality program attempted to have an impact on the customer experiencebeginning with booking, continuing during the physical stay, and enduring after the stay. Accorwanted to offer guests “greater simplicity, fluidity and recognition at every stage of the customer experience.” Explained Badrinath:
Technology enables you to have an easier and better travel experience. So fundamentally it’s about improving the customer experience in such a way that we areable to be with them throughout their journey and hence to be able to target them with advertisements, promotions, and information that will help them plan their next trip.21
What is important is the customer knowledge and the loyalty programme and the way you digitise that to make those customers have the best experience possible. Our aspiration is really that people think of themselves as loyal Accor customers, so first they check the app to see if a destination has a property that they like and that is their firstchoice. And that’s what the battle is about—that we are the first choice; that customers are tempted to choose Accor first.22
Digital Hospitality included both customer-focused and employee-focused elements. The customer-focused programs were directed to improve customers’ knowledge of the company and itsbrands, the welcome that they were given when they interacted with the company, and the services provided to them both online and offline. Managers hoped that these initiatives would help the company better manage its relationships with customers and lead to loyalty gains.
Mobile First The 2014 acquisition of French start-up Wipolo, creator of a mobile traveling companion application, jumpstarted Accor’s mobile activities. Accor’s Mobile First solution deliveredrobust mobile device functionality, the outcome of a strategic investment in mobile that anticipated it
becoming the primary customer-booking and communication channel. A single mobile applicationhandled all of the tasks related to the customer’s journey, making mobile the customer’s primary channel of contact with the company. Mobile was a key component of Accor’s strategy, as itaccounted for 12% of the company’s current web sales, a number that was rapidly increasing. “Theapp opens up the possibility of deepening our relationship with the customer. In contrast to just providing booking services, an app can act as a comprehensive companion for the customer—before, during and after their stay—allowing them to browse and dream about our properties; to book efficiently; enjoy digital services within the hotel; as well as give meaningful feedback and managetheir loyalty programme,” said Badrinath.23
Customer centric This initiative included efforts to strengthen Accor’s customer relationshipmanagement processes. All customer data, previously scattered across multiple databases, wascentralized into a single platform, termed “Voice of the Guests,” that could be mined andappropriated by employees to enable the delivery of personalized interactions and services. The company employed an in-house recommendation engine dubbed SMART that allowed it to automatically generate personalized messaging and customized offers to customers based on their profile, visit history, consumption habits, and click streams on Accor websites. This was a huge improvement, explained Badrinath:
Our Voice of the Guests initiative will aggregate all the flows from guest satisfaction surveys, online reputation and user review sites which will allow our properties to get a comprehensive view of what customers think about their experience in their hotel.24
It’s a big CRM investment—we have 40 million customers in our database, and ahuge wealth of information, which today we don’t harness completely. That’s why I sayit goes beyond booking. Distribution uses this information for bookings, forreservations, but there’s much more to the customers’ tastes than just booking a hotel room. So having information about their stays and the opinions that they gave when they visited the hotel is a big issue and one that we need to develop.25
Seamless journey This component was designed to enhance customer convenience at every touch point by streamlining the customer’s experience with electronic payment solutions, one-click booking, online check-in and checkout, offers targeted to guest preferences, and communication afterthe stay to encourage social networking. “Welcome by le Club Accorhotels is a broad ranging program, starting with online check-in and ending with a fast checkout for participants. Its purpose is to remove paperwork, reduce formalities, and make sure that the customer gets a personalized welcome. Customer reactions so far have been very enthusiastic as 93% of guests who have tried
the welcome service want to use it again,” said Badrinath.26
The employee- and partner-focused solutions included a dynamic pricing and revenue management system, tablet and smartphone apps that simplified employees’ duties and enabledthem to share best practices with others, and business intelligence and analytics that provided easy access to and analysis of the large volumes of customer and operating data that the parent company collected each day across its brands. Badrinath explained:
We have decided to act on all of the levers that make up the Accor experience. All our stakeholders—customers, employees, and partners—will benefit from this wide- reaching digital transformation, which is built around migration to mobile devices, a more personalized service and a seamless customer journey.
The key difference between our current plan and previous actions is that Digital Hospitality puts digital transformation at the center of the organization and acts as a philosophy that guides everything we do. What is truly innovative is that it takes into account all our stakeholders . . . giving a real 360-degree vision that balances our actions to insure a win-win for all concerned.28
Bazin continued:
Accor is transforming on a strategic, digital and managerial level. The plan addresses the full range of digital challenges and aims to make Accor the leader of a fast-changing industry. Accor is the leading hotel operator worldwide, backed by strong resources and unparalleled expertise. Combining these assets with our new digital ambition will allow us to expand our operational excellence through the entire industry value chain, betteranticipate customers’ expectations, and bolster our leadership over the long term.29
Thus, one factor in the decision whether or not to add Room Key to Accor’s distribution portfolio was whether signing on would enhance or detract from Accor’s own online presence.
The Room Key Opportunity
Like many e-commerce businesses, Room Key’s initial challenge was gaining visibility in an overcrowded, online travel marketplace. Most online travel companies drove traffic to their sites using a combination of brand recognition—built through traditional outbound marketing programs including television advertising—and search engine marketing (SEM). In 2014, $624.7 million was spent in the U.S. by online travel businesses on national television advertising; Trivago and Expedia both spent over $100 million to build their brands, while Hotwire spent $92 million and Hotels.com spent $50.2 million.30 After several years of this heavy investment in advertising, most OTAs benefited from high consumer brand awareness, which drove organic traffic to their websites. They supplemented this with extremely high spending on SEM; Priceline’s global search ad budget withGoogle was estimated to be $1.14 billion in 2012, which generated further traffic.31
As a new company, however, Room Key’s brand was unknown to consumers, and theorganization lacked both the expertise and budget needed to be able to compete effectively against the major OTAs in outbound marketing. Seeking to overcome this challenge, the company decided to focus on acquiring website visitors via exit traffic from the six founders’ websites, targeting shoppers who abandoned their search without booking. When visitors to member brands’ websites exitedwithout purchasing—reportedly some 95% of visitors—a pop-under ad for Room Key appeared on their screens, offering a range of similar hotels in the same travel destination, curated from the Room Key brand partner portfolio. From there, customers could click on an offer to link directly to a brand- specific website to book a room. Thus, Room Key was designed to intercept customers leaving anindividual hotel brand’s website and reroute them to a curated list of hotel rooms from all of theRoom Key partners, thus keeping consumers in a closed loop system. CEO John F. Davis III explainedthat Room Key’s business model was built around offering branded hotels “one last shot to convince the consumer” before they defected to a nonpartnering competitor or to an OTA.32 Fifty-four percent of prospective travelers visited three or more different websites as they browsed options and compared prices, while another 25% visited two.33 Keeping these prospects shopping within thepartners’ networks could yield big benefits.
Partners offered 10% of their exit traffic to Room Key, which reportedly brought 10 million potential travelers to the Room Key website during its debut year.34 Best Western International signed on as the first commercial partner, and was soon joined by La Quinta Inns & Suites,Millennium Hotels & Resorts, and Leading Hotels of the World, increasing Room Key’s inventory of properties to 50,000. Commercial partners had no equity stake in Room Key, so unlike the individual properties of the equity partners, which were automatically enrolled and would have to opt out toavoid using Room Key’s booking service, each individual property in the commercial partners’portfolio had to opt in to receive the benefits of Room Key, making implementation much more unwieldy. Commercial partners paid a higher commission rate on Room Key bookings, more than the 10% paid by equity partners, but substantially less than the 25% typically paid to OTAs. Becoming an equity partner was expensive, so at the end of the day, it came down to a decision based on return on investment. Each hotel chain partner was unique in how it performed on various operational and financial metrics, so each would vary in how it assessed how much joining Room Key would contribute to its success.
Partners expressed confidence in Room Key’s potential for driving their businesses. Increasingdirect bookings was a major objective, as indirect bookings were gaining market share each year, costing the industry an estimated $4 billion by 2014.
Lincoln Merrihew of the research firm Compete noted:
Room Key’s role in distribution is still evolving. Today, it’s more of a backstop for the founders in an effort to keep bookings within the family—in other wordsminimizing lost business. That’s important and has huge financial upside. The value oflost bookings to the hotel industry can reach into the billions of dollars, so it’s a bigchallenge. In the future, to the extent Room Key can build its own presence and brand equity, it may become a destination in and of itself (much as many OTAs are today). If that happens, there is a high likelihood of bringing incremental traffic and bookings to its founders.35
But some industry analysts doubted Room Key’s longer-term viability. Said Hotel Analyst:
More and more people are asking if this latest initiative to combat the power of the OTAs is the biggest mistake the major hotel companies have made in a long time. To gain traction, Room Key has to overcome several challenges, most of which individually seem impossible and which collectively are insurmountable.36
The greatest challenge to Room Key’s ability to deliver value to hotel brands was establishing itself as a brand in the overcrowded online travel marketplace. This would be extremely difficult,given Room Key’s intention to spend little on conventional outbound marketing tools, such as SEMand mass media advertising.
Thus, Room Key’s visibility in the online marketplace depended almost entirely on being seen bytransient brand-website visitors who were about to exit the hotel branded sites without purchasing. This raised the question of whether the strategy of using pop-under ads would attract enough visitors.
Other analysts questioned the effectiveness of the exit-traffic strategy, not only as a means of finding customers, but also as being able to deliver a positive customer experience. Even though pop- under ads did not block the content a person was currently viewing, as the more intrusive pop-up
ads that loaded on top of viewable content did, there was a risk that some customers would feel similarly about pop-under ads as they did about pop-ups. Were pop-under ads enough to grabconsumers’ attention and get them to click?
When Room Key dropped its beta tag in May 2012, it added customer reviews, primarily pulled from TripAdvisor, to its website. It also announced a partnership with the OTA Travelocity and its Res99 network, which added an additional 100,000 hotels (from outside the Room Key partnernetwork) to Room Key’s inventory. Booking through Travelocity on Room Key was effectivelyinvisible to a customer. The only differentiation between links provided to partners’ properties and those back to Travelocity was that partner bookings were signified by a button marked “Book Direct”and accompanied by a hotel brand logo, while bookings through Travelocity were signified by abutton marked “Book.” If Room Key customers booked through Travelocity, they lost all of the benefits of booking direct.
Room Key’s Customer Value Proposition
Room Key featured a simple, easy-to-navigate booking experience with all the benefits of directbooking. From the customers’ perspective, Room Key felt like an OTA-like marketplace, but the fact that it was partially owned by the hotel brands gave it some important advantages. Booking direct opened up a host of opportunities for customers that were not available to them when they used OTAs—guaranteeing them the lowest rates, helping them avoid hidden fees and/or change penalties, allowing them to earn hotel reward program points and to request a specific room, and providing them with the information and higher-quality brand experience of shopping on a hotel- owned website. It also offered users flexibility when they had to change a reservation.
There was some evidence that Room Key did save customers money. Dennis Schaal of USA Todayreported:
In trying Room Key, I found instances when it offered a different room type or lower rates at specific properties of its founding hotels than were available on sites such as Expedia. For example, you could book a studio with two queen beds and a sofa bed at the Residence Inn City Center in Philadelphia via Room Key at a $269 room rate. The lowest rates there on Expedia and Orbitz were $279 for a different type of room.37
At Accor, questions were raised about how the Room Key customer experience aligned with thecompany’s own goal to deliver a high-quality emotional experience at all touch points. But Davis feltconfident that Room Key could deliver a superior customer experience: “Consumers weren’t getting the type of product they deserved to book a hotel room. It’s a personal purchase; you’re spending anight with these companies. What could we do to make consumers happier?”38 He posited that customers benefited not only from attractive room rates and the opportunity to earn loyalty points, but also from a better booking experience that was more seamlessly integrated into the experience ofengaging with the hotel itself. After all, when customers clicked on the “Book Direct” button on Room Key’s website, they were sent directly to the affiliated hotel’s branded website. Sickel ofInterContinental Hotels Group said:
The fact is customers like to shop. They go to four or five sites before booking, but at the same time, customers tell us they like the confidence of booking with the brand website. This is about providing customers choices and delivering a great user experience without the clutter you might see on a third-party distributor.
Did Room Key Fit with Accor’s Digital Strategy?
Before making a decision on whether to partner with or become a commercial customer of Room Key, Accor had to consider the extent to which Room Key was succeeding in delivering value to its member brands. A report issued by Compete showed rapid growth during its launch period.Compete characterized its growth as “remarkable,” noting that by July 2012, Room Key had morethan 4 million unique visitors. The site was delivering traffic back to its equity partners’ websites. By September 2012, Room Key’s traffic volume had increased to more than 14 million unique visitors permonth.
Davis expressed considerable satisfaction with the site’s progress and expanding i