Jonathan Vogel advocates the Explanationist response to the Deceiver Argument for skepticism about the external world

1. Jonathan Vogel advocates the Explanationist response to the Deceiver Argument for skepticism about the external world. On the basis of the information available on the slides, it is most likely that Vogel counts as:

a. an idealist.

b. a skeptic about the external world.

c. an indirect realist about the external world.

d. an anti-realist about knowledge.

2. Michael Huemer’s ‘How Can You Get Outside Your Head?’ argument argument concludes that ‘we have no knowledge of the physical world.’ Given the reasoning that his argument summarizes, is the ‘of the physical world’ qualification important? If so, why?

a. No, it’s not important. The reasoning leads equally to the conclusion that we have no knowledge of anything at all.

b. Yes, it’s important. We often have good evidence for what goes on in our own minds, in the form of the results of fMRI scans. So, the argument allows that we can sometimes know what goes on in our own minds, even if we can’t know what goes on outside our minds.

c. Yes, it’s important. According to the argument, we are never directly aware of electrons, atoms, or molecules. We only directly aware of middle-sized things, such as tables and chairs. We might know about tables, but not about electrons.

d. Yes, it’s important. According to the argument, we are never directly aware of physical objects. We are only directly aware of sense data (mental images, experiences, etc.), which are in our minds. We might know about sense data, but not about external things like tables.

Suppose that you are in a situation that is correctly described by the following decision matrix:

Coin lands heads (probability=.5)

Coin lands tails (probability=.5)

Play the game

utility=1,000,000

utility= -999,999

Don’t play the game

utility=0

utility=0

3. According to MaxEU:

a. morality requires you to play the game.

b. morality requires you not to play the game.

c. rationality requires you to play the game.

d. rationality requires you not to play the game.

4. In lecture, we discussed the Modest Response to the Argument from Evil. Initially, it seems plausible that some actual evils are gratuitous, on the grounds that we are unable to detect any justification for those evils, even after careful consideration. As Professor Gilmore explained in lecture, skeptical theists have replied to this by arguing that:

a. justifications for permitting the given evils are like dogs in a garage: if they were there, we would see them. So we are justified in believing that there is no justification for the evils in question.

b. justifications for permitting the given evils are like fleas in a garage: even if they were there, we probably wouldn’t see them. So we are not justified in believing that there is no justification for the evils in question.

c. the justification for permitting the evils is that they are necessary by-products of free will, whose value outweighs and compensates for the evils in question.

d. the justification for permitting evil is that God freely chose to do so, and whatever God freely chooses to do is justified, since free will is so valuable.

Argument (i)

P1 An action A is morally permissible if and only if no other action that is open to the agent of A at the time of A has a greater utility than A does.

P2 All human actions are causally determined by events in the distant past.

P3 If all human actions are causally determined by events in the distant past, then for any human action A that is actually performed, no other action aside from A is open to the agent of A at the time of A.

P4 If, for any human action A that is actually performed, no other action aside from A is open to the agent of A at the time of A, then for any human action A that is actually performed, no other action that is open to the agent of A has a greater utility than A does.

P5 Dylann Roof’s firing on church-goers is a human action that was actually performed.

– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –

: . Dylann Roof’s firing on church-goers was morally permissible.

Most of us will want to say that this conclusion is false. But if the conclusion is false, there must be some specific problem with Argument (i). Different philosophical positions yield different verdicts about where the argument goes wrong.

5. According to libertarianism (interpreted as a view about free will, not as a political view):

a. P1, at least, is false. Other premises may be false as well.

b. P2, at least, is false. Other premises may be false as well.

c. P3, at least, is false. Other premises may be false as well.

d. P4, at least, is false. Other premises may be false as well.

6. According to non-consequentialist ethical theories, such as Ross’s theory or some theory that includes the Doctrine of Double Effect:

a. P1, at least, is false. Other premises may be false as well.

b. P2, at least, is false. Other premises may be false as well.

c. P3, at least, is false. Other premises may be false as well.

d. P4, at least, is false. Other premises may be false as well.

7. Assume that you are a utilitarian and a soft determinist. Assume that you grant that the Roof shooting was a human action that was actually performed. Assume that you deny the conclusion of Argument (i). Holding all that fixed, which of following should you consider to be the best criticism of Argument (i)?

a. P1 is false. Some actions (e.g., Roof’s) are not permissible even though no other action open to the agent had a higher utility.

b. P2 is false. If time could be rewound to instant t in 1950, for example, events could play out differently thereafter, without any violation of the laws of physics or any difference in how things were at t. The same goes for the time of Roof’s action. He could have refrained from doing it, without violating any laws of physics.

c. P3 is false. Even though Roof’s action was causally determined by events in the distant past, it was still a free action, since it was caused in the right way by his beliefs and desires; and there were other actions open to him, in the sense that, if he had wanted and chosen to do those other actions instead, he would have done them; nothing external would have stood in his way.

d. The conclusion is obviously false. Roof’s action caused a huge amount of pain and suffering for many innocent people, and there was no positive justification for it. It involved treating other people as mere means, and it involved treating people in a way that the agent would not like to be treated by them. Regardless of which normative ethical theory you accept — for example, utilitarianism, ethical egoism, Ross’s theory— you should agree that Roof’s action was deeply wrong.

8. According to the lectures,

a. numerical identity is represented by ‘=’ and applies only to numbers.

b. numerical identity is represented by ‘=’ and applies to everything, not just numbers.

c. strictly speaking, nothing is numerically identical even to itself.

d. numerical identity applies to everything, not just numbers. To say that x is numerically identical to y is just to say that x is exactly similar to y.

e. x is numerically identical to y if and only if x has at least one property in common with y.

9. According to the lectures,

a. numerical identity and qualitative identity are the same thing.

b. ‘x is numerically identical to y’ means that x and y are exactly alike, i.e., exactly similar. ‘x is qualitatively identical to y’ means that x and y are one and the same thing.

c. ‘x is numerically identical to y’ means that x and y are one and the same thing. ‘x is qualitatively identical to y’ means that x and y are exactly alike, i.e., exactly similar.

d. qualitative identity is just identity, as applied to properties, whereas numerical identity is just identity, as applied to numbers.

10. Soft determinists and libertarians agree that

a. the existence of free will is compatible with determinism.

b. people at least sometimes act freely.

c. the laws of nature are deterministic.

d. the existence of free will is not compatible with determinism.

e. the past, together with the laws of nature, do not determine the future.

11. Soft determinists and hard determinists agree that

a. the existence of free will is compatible with determinism.

b. people at least sometimes act freely.

c. the laws of nature are deterministic.

d. the existence of free will is not compatible with determinism.

e. the past, together with the laws of nature, do not determine the future.

12. Libertarians and hard determinists agree that

a. the existence of free will is compatible with determinism.

b. people at least sometimes act freely.

c. the laws of nature are deterministic.

d. the existence of free will is not compatible with determinism.

e. the past, together with the laws of nature, do not determine the future.

13. Sider’s example involving one million perfect duplicates of Hitler is meant to show that

a. if quantum mechanics is true, then the laws of nature are not deterministic. The past and present together with the laws of nature do not determine all the facts about which future events will occur. They only determine the facts about the probabilities of those events.

b. if quantum mechanics is true, then the laws of nature are deterministic. The past and present together with the laws of nature determine all the fact about which future events will occur.

c. agent causal libertarianism is plausible if quantum mechanics is true, but not otherwise.

d. agent causal libertarianism is plausible only if agent causation can disrupt the probabilities of future events, but if quantum mechanics is true, agent causation cannot do.

14. Compatibilists say that:

a. we have free will and, although the laws of nature are deterministic, that’s only because we have freely chosen to make them so.

b. although the laws of nature are deterministic, we are still free, and in fact we often violate the laws of nature. (We did this whenever we act freely against what we were determined to do.)

c. even if all of our actions are causally determined by the past plus the laws, that wouldn’t rule out our acting freely, because free action isn’t uncaused action; it’s action that has the right sort of internal cause.

d. Libertarianism is compatible with Hard Determinism.

15. According to the Indiscernibility of Identicals,

a. if no one can tell objects o1 and o2 apart, then o1 and o2 are identical.

b. if objects o1 and 2 are not identical, then they do not have exactly the same properties.

c. if no one can tell objects o1 and o2 apart, then o1 and o2 are exactly alike.

d. if objects o1 and o2 have exactly the same properties, then they are identical.

e. if objects o1 and o2 do not have exactly the same properties, then they are not identical.

16. Consider this simple memory theory of personal identity: x is the same person as y if and only if x can remember y’s thoughts. Thomas Reid’s counterexample concerning the transitivity of identity shows:

a. that since it might turn out that (1) I remember what I was thinking yesterday, and (2) yesterday I remembered what I was thinking the day before, (3) I don’t currently remember what I was thinking 2 days ago, and since (4) identity is transitive, it follows that the above theory is false.

b. that since it might turn out that (1) I remember what I was thinking yesterday, and (2) yesterday I remembered what I was thinking the day before, (3) I don’t remember what I was thinking 2 days ago, and since (4) identity is transitive, it follows that the above theory is true.

c. that since I can remember what I was doing yesterday and the day before, it follows that I am identical to the both people.

d. that since the relation “x remembered what y was thinking” is transitive, the above theory must be true.

17. According to Shoemaker, the brain transfer case is problematic for the body theory of personal identity because:

a. it seems right to say that my soul wouldn’t know whether to follow my brain or remain in my body.

b. it seems right to say that brain transfers are not really physically possible.

c. it seems right to say that I would go where my brain goes, not where my body goes.

d. it seems right to say that I would stay where my body stays, not go where my brain goes.

18. Suppose that, unbeknownst to me, the soul of a WWI war criminal was attached to my body at birth. At first glance at least, according to the __________________ of personal identity, I should be held responsible for the war criminal’s actions because _________________.

a. psychological continuity theory; according to this theory, souls guarantee psychological continuity.

b. soul theory; according to this theory, the war criminal and I are psychologically continuous.

c. soul theory; according to this theory, I am numerically identical to the WWI war criminal.

d. body theory; according to this theory, identity of soul is sufficient for identity of body.

19. The Body Theory faces a potential problem (discussed in lecture) involving corpses. According to the given argument against the Body Theory:

a. we cease to exist when we die, but our bodies typically do not.

b. bodies are divisible, but we are not.

c. we have mental properties, but our bodies do not.

d. my body and I are made of different matter.

e. corpses are made out of matter, but we are not.

20. Suppose that Nestor was an ancient Greek warrior who committed many crimes. Further, suppose that I exist in 2018 and have no memory of doing what Nestor did. Finally, suppose that Nestor and I have the same soul. It follows that:

a. Nestor and I have different brains.

b. Nestor and I have the same brain.

c. if I am the same person as Nestor, then the soul theory is true.

d. if the soul theory is true, then I am the same person as Nestor.

21. Suppose that I begin my life in one body, body1, but that later in life my brain is transplanted into a different body, body2. Further, suppose that after the transplant, I wake up the next morning and have body2 as my body (but I continue to have my same old brain). It follows that:

a. The Body Theory is not true.

b. The Body Theory is true.

c. The Brain Theory is not true.

d. The Brain Theory is true.

e. None of the above.

22. In lecture, we discussed one main argument against the Memory Theory of Personal Identity, an argument which did not apply to the Psychological Continuity Theory of Personal Identity. According to that argument:

a. The Memory Theory cannot handle the possibility of cases of personal fission.

b. identity is transitive (if a=b and b=c, then a=c), whereas being able to remember having some experience that person p once had is not transitive (as Thomas Reid’s ‘Brave Officer’ example brings out).

c. The memory theory is incompatible with the possibility of life after death.

d. all memory theories of personal identity are vulnerable to ‘reduplication problems’.

e. as Sydney Shoemaker and others have pointed out, the concept of memory must be analyzed in terms of identity (to distinguish it from various forms of pseudo-memory), hence any attempt to analyze the concept of personal identity in terms of memory would be viciously circular.

23. Shoemaker’s Brown/Brownson argument, if successful, would show that sameness of body is _______ for personal identity. (According to Shoemaker, there are two bodies in the case: Body B and Body R. Brown has Body B on day 1 and Robinson has Body R on day 1. On day 2, after the brain transplant, Brown, not Robinson, has Body R, and Brown no longer has Body B , according to Shoemaker.)

a. not sufficient

b. neither necessary nor sufficient

c. not necessary

d. both necessary and sufficient

24. What does Descartes think that he has accomplished in the Cogito?

a. He has found that he cannot doubt the existence of external objects.

b. He has shown that he can doubt the existence of every material thing.

c. He has proved that we are all conscious.

d. He has discovered, for the first time, a truth of which he can be absolutely certain – that he exists.

e. He has demonstrated the existence of God.

25. Why did Russell find the Cogito unconvincing?

a. Because the reasoning of the Cogito can be conducted even in the absence of any consciousness, thinking, or mental activity.

b. Because it relies on a prior insight to the effect that certain inference rules are valid, and if so then it cannot deliver ‘something from nothing’.

c. Because Russell had convincing proofs of the non-existence of God, which he took to carry more weight than Descartes’ argument.

d. Because the existence of external objects is knowable a priori.

e. Because, what is certain from ‘in here’ is not that I am thinking/experiencing, but merely that there are thoughts/experiences.

26. What, according to Gilmore, is the problem with Russell’s objection to the Cogito?

a. There can’t be thoughts without a thinker. So, given that Russell admits that it’s certain that there are thoughts, he must admit that it is certain that they have a thinker, i.e., that he exists.

b. Russell thinks that it’s certain that there are thoughts. But that’s not certain. For all Russell can tell, it might just be that there’s an illusion that there are thoughts.

c. If Russell’s objection were right, it wouldn’t be certain, from ‘in here’, that (IZ) is false: (IZ) others exist and have thoughts, and I exist, but I’m unconscious and have no thoughts. But it is certain, on the basis of introspection, that (IZ) is false.

d. None of the above.

27. Theism is the view that:

a. the supreme being is the word ‘the’.

b. at least one god exists.

c. God does not exist.

d. the mind is separate from the body.

28. Anselm thinks that a being than which none greater can be conceived cannot exist in the understanding alone. Why?

a. Because, if it existed in the understanding alone, a contradiction would result – specifically: the thing in question both (i) would be a being than which none greater can be conceived (by hypothesis), and (ii) would not be a being than which none greater can be conceived (since, because it exists in the understanding alone, its degree of greatness is exceeded by a different degree of greatness that we can conceive of something as having: a being just like the thing in question except that it exists in reality too).

b. Because the understanding is finite, whereas a being than which none greater can be conceived would be infinite, and no infinite being can exist in a finite realm. In other words, our minds are not capable of comprehending such a being, and hence it cannot exist in the understanding at all.

c. Because, for any degree of greatness, D, that it is possible for us to conceive of some being as having, there is some other degree of greatness, D+, that meets both of the following conditions: (i) D+ exceeds D, and (ii) it is possible for someone to conceive of something as having D+. Roughly put, for any conceivable being, a greater can be conceived. Hence, it is impossible for a being than which none greater can be conceived to exist in our understanding.

d. Because the understanding is a part of reality; hence anything that exists in the understanding also exists in reality; hence nothing exists in the understanding but not in reality. I.e., nothing exists in the understanding alone. It follows that anything that we can conceive of exists not merely in the mind but also in reality. In particular, since we can conceive that there is a being, o, and a degree of greatness D, such that [for any degree of greatness, D*, if D* exceeds D, then it is not possible for someone to conceive that something has D*], it follows that such a being exists both in our minds and in external reality.

29. In the lectures, a version of Guanilo’s objection to Anselm’s argument was presented. This version of Gaunilo’s objection aimed to show that Anselm’s argument:

a. has a false conclusion

b. has at least one false premise

c. was invalid

d. proved the existence of a perfect island

30. According to the lectures, the main problem with Anselm’s ontological argument (as we reconstructed it) was that

a. its first premise rests on the implausible principle that if one has a coherent F-concept, then there is an F that exists in one’s understanding.

b. its first premise rests on the implausible principle that existing in the understanding and existing in reality are mutually exclusive.

c. its first premise rests on the implausible principle that existence is a predicate. (Existence, if there is such a thing, is a property, not a predicate. The verb ‘exists’ may be a predicate, but existence itself is not.)

d. its second premise rests on the implausible principle that existence is a predicate. (Existence, if there is such a thing, is a property, not a predicate. The verb ‘exists’ may be a predicate, but existence itself is not.)

e. its second premise rests on the implausible principle that for any two things, x and y, if x exists in reality and y does not, but x and y are otherwise as similar as it is possible for them to be, then all things considered, x is greater than y.

31. As stated in lecture, the first premise of the Kalam Cosmological argument is, “Whatever begins to exist has a cause.” Why is it important to use that premise, instead of the simpler premise, “Whatever exists has a cause”?

a. Because there is no plausible claim that can be combined with the simpler premise to yield a valid argument for the conclusion “The universe has a cause”.

b. Because Aristotle distinguishes formal cause from efficient cause, and the simpler premise is incompatible with that distinction.

c. Because Al Ghazali did not believe that the universe exists, only that it existed.

d. Because the simpler premise would force the theist to say that God had a cause.

32. Pascal’s Wager aimed to show that:

a. the proposition that God exists is likely to be true.

b. we shouldn’t believe in the existence of God if God’s existence has low probability

c. only one description of God is right

d. we have practical reasons to believe that God exists.

33. In lecture, some problems were raised for Pascal’s Wager. One of those problems was that:

a. there are too many different gods that one could believe in. The expected utility of believing in some god is higher than the expected utility of believing in no god, but the difference is so small as to be of no practical importance.

b. if we become believers in God in the hope of getting a reward, it might still turn out that there is no God, and hence we get no reward, but we have given up a great deal of pleasure on Earth by living a pious lifestyle.

c. there might be a Bizarro God that punishes believers with eternal damnation and rewards nonbelievers with eternal happiness in the afterlife. This cancels out any supposed gain in expected utility from being a believer.

d. Pascal’s Wager does show that practical rationality demands that we believe in God, but it does not show that theism is likely to be true.

Consider the following argument:

P1 If there were an omnipotent and omnibenevolent God, then there would not be any evils – bad situations.

P2 There are evils.

C Therefore, there is no omnipotent and omnibenevolent God.

Now consider the following objection to this argument:

Perhaps an omnipotent and omnibenevolent God would permit evils that are logically necessary for some adequately compensating good, or for the avoidance of something worse.

34. According to Professor Gilmore in lecture, how does this objection bear upon the argument above?

a. It casts doubt on P1.

b. It casts doubt on P2.

c. It casts doubt on C.

d. It gives us reason for doubting that C follows from P1 and P2.

35. Suppose that person A, in all sincerity, gives an argument for a conclusion C, where (unbeknownst to A) conclusion C is false. Person B suspects that C is false and attempts to address A’s argument in the following way: B considers C carefully, and then B respectfully offers a new argument against C that seems more powerful than A’s argument in support of C. Person A in the end is unsure what to think. According to Professor Gilmore in lecture, is B’s response an ideal way to address A’s argument? Why or why not?

a. Yes. B is giving reasons rather than merely making an assertion or an appeal to authority.

b. No. An ideal response would convince A that B is right, which B has not yet done.

c. Yes. B has approached the issue in a thoughtful manner and with a respectful, non-adversarial tone.

d. No. Since conclusion C is false, there must be something wrong with A’s argument for C. An ideal way of addressing the argument would specify the problem with the argument, rather than merely attacking the conclusion.